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Abstract: Looking at the Royal 
Canadian  Navy ’s  operat ional 
record between 1945 to 1950 it 
would appear that one exercise, 
two deployments, and a scientific 
expedition in the Arctic was not the 
type of commitment that matched the 
growing strategic significance of this 
area in the immediate postwar period.   
Analysis of documents from this time, 
however, shows that the RCN not only 
was keen to explore the extreme and 
unique challenges that this region 
posed to naval operations, but also 
that the navy was eager to protect 
the nation’s interests in the Arctic.  
This article, therefore, looks at early 
RCN attitudes towards the Arctic as 
well as the tactical and operational 
factors that impacted these early 
Northern forays.  In doing so it argues 
that it was government cutbacks and 
limited resources that prevented them 
from doing more.
“An unusual voyage in far 
    northern waters”1
The Royal Canadian Navy’s first 
postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950
Richard O. Mayne
No one in Canada knew it was there. The automatic weather 
station set up on the shore of 
northern Labrador by the German 
submarine U-537 in October 1943 
was undiscovered until 1981, when a 
German researcher alerted Canadian 
authorities. Yet the fact that the Royal 
Canadian Navy (RCN) virtually 
ignored the country’s Northern 
littoral during the Second World 
War was understandable. Despite 
this single incursion into what at 
the time was the British colony of 
Newfoundland, Germany did not 
have the technology to threaten 
Canada’s North. This state of affairs 
quickly changed in the immediate 
postwar period.2 The emergence of 
the Soviet Union as a threat to Western 
security and the development of new 
technologies, such as long-range 
aircraft, made the Canadian Arctic a 
potential frontline in a future conflict. 
At least that was the conclusion 
drawn by the United States Navy 
(USN) whose increased interest and 
activity in the Arctic raised Canadian 
concerns about sovereignty. This 
created an awkward situation for 
the RCN, which was caught between 
a worried ally and a new adversary 
who were both eyeing a region of 
the nation in which Canadian forces 
had little tactical or operational 
experience.
I m p o r t a n t  s t u d i e s  h a v e 
addressed the larger strategic 
context of challenges to Canadian 
sovereignty in the Arctic during 
and immediately after the Second 
World War.3 This article, by contrast, 
focuses on the RCN’s activities in 
the Arctic between 1946 and 1950 
from a tactical and operational 
perspective. It does so because this 
approach yields important insights 
into the RCN’s attitudes towards the 
Arctic and the unique operational 
challenges they faced in this region. 
Indeed, the operational records 
from this period (which show that 
the RCN only initiated one exercise, 
two northern deployments and a 
scientific expedition4) suggest that 
the Canadian Arctic was not only 
“the sole domain of the USN,” 
but also that the RCN failed to 
represent the national interests in 
the North prior to the commissioning 
of HMCS Labrador, the Navy’s first 
(and only) icebreaker, in 1954.5 
However, closer examination of 
these documents reveals that after 
1945 the Navy gave the Arctic a high 
priority and stretched its extremely 
limited resources as much as possible 
to establish a presence there in spite 
of the challenges posed by the great 
distances and extreme environment. 
Opposite: The Royal Canadian Navy only 
made it into the Arctic a few times prior 
to the commissioning of HMCS Labrador 
in 1954, and that creates a perception 
it was not interested in this area in the 
immediate postwar period. In reality, 
northern operations were a focus of the 
Navy from 1945 on and were limited 
only by a paucity of available resources.
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There were two things that the 
Americans had come to accept about 
the Arctic in late 1945. The first 
was that growing tensions with 
their former Soviet partners would 
increase the strategic significance 
of the region, while the second was 
that any defence preparations in 
the Arctic would involve thorny 
negotiations with their Canadian 
al l ies .  Certainly that  was the 
conclusion drawn by historian 
George Stanley who observed that 
the American government’s 1946 
unilateral announcement of the 
dispatch of a US Navy expedition 
to Melville Island “had…the effect 
of spurring Canada into a greater 
watchfulness [and] activity in Arctic 
development.”6 In reality, this 
supposed trigger to Canadian naval 
involvement in the Arctic was never 
pulled; this myth was the product 
of erroneous assumptions made by 
an over-anxious national media.7 
Not only did the Americans ask 
permission to visit and establish a 
weather station on the island, but 
they also respected the fact that the 
Canadian cabinet had deferred a 
decision on whether to commit to this 
venture until 1947.8 
Although the significance of the 
Melville Island incident has been 
exaggerated, there is ample evidence 
that Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King’s Liberal government 
did not want Canada to be the spark 
that ignited the simmering tensions 
between the US and Soviet Union. In 
fact, the government was willing to 
go to considerable lengths to avoid 
the appearance that it was siding too 
closely with the Americans in Arctic 
defence. Discussions in late 1945 
regarding the joint Canadian Army-
Royal Canadian Air Force Operation 
Musk-Ox (a 3,100-mile trek from 
Churchill, Manitoba, to Edmonton, 
Alberta, to test equipment in cold 
weather environments) provided a 
good example of these sensitivities. 
Suggestions that American observers 
wear Canadian uniforms to conceal 
their identities were viewed with 
grave scepticism south of the border. 
Similarly, the Canadian government’s 
desire to publicize the mission as 
“peaceful” and “purely scientific” 
in nature brought the US Naval 
Attaché in Ottawa to mockingly 
observe that the Soviets were “not… 
born yesterday” and were “not 
swallowing this explanation.”9 The 
Americans were right and King knew 
it. King brooded in his diary that the 
“Musk-Ox expedition,” had been 
“folly” and had gone a long way to 
increasing Soviet suspicions of the 
West.10 
The American desire to operate 
in the Arctic only served to heighten 
these Canadian fears. For instance, 
the appropriately named Operation 
Frostbite in early 1946 saw the large 
attack carrier USS Midway sail into 
The USS Midway, a large US fleet carrier, 
participated in Operation Frostbite in 
March 1946 which involved sailing 
the carrier and its support vessels 
into the icy waters of the Davis Strait 
between Labrador and Greenland. Top: 
The Midway passes through icy water. 
Bottom: A Corsair on the deck of the 
carrier needs to be cleared of ice and 
snow before flying operations can 
commence.
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Davis Strait to test the effect of cold 
weather on air operations. While 
the ships that carried out Frostbite 
did not actually sail into Canadian 
waters, those assigned to Operation 
Nanook, also in 1946, did manage 
to do so (this was the operation that 
was originally going to establish the 
Melville Island weather station). 
Consisting of five warships and 
one Coast Guard vessel, Nanook 
was primarily a reconnaissance 
and training exercise designed to 
familiarise the USN with Arctic 
conditions. Despite an invitation for 
Canadian observers to participate, 
King’s  government  remained 
concerned about appearances. 
Although giving their blessing for 
Nanook, the government again asked 
that any publicity surrounding the 
exercise be kept as “undramatic as 
possible with emphasis on scientific 
knowledge acquired rather than on 
purely defence aspects.” 
King was clearly nervous about 
military activity in the Canadian 
north, yet there is a well-told story in 
an important popular history of the 
Canadian Navy that the service only 
took an interest in the region because 
the prime minister was willing to 
acquire a replacement aircraft carrier 
for HMCS Warrior providing the 
new vessel was “Arcticized.”11 Upon 
closer examination, however, this 
support for the Navy operating in 
the North actually came from the new 
defence minister, Brooke Claxton, 
rather than King. The prime minister 
remained unrelenting in his belief 
that Canada’s northern policy should 
be “primarily a civilian one,” and 
while his government was willing 
to co-operate with the Americans 
in northern defence he privately 
argued that “our best defence in 
the Arctic was the Arctic itself” – a 
rather naïve belief that inhospitable 
conditions in the north were enough 
to deter any aggressor.12 His thoughts 
about replacing Warrior were even 
more direct, as he confided to his 
diary that the idea of procuring the 
British carrier Magnificent made him 
“shudder.”13 
Claxton, moreover, did not 
understand that “Arcticizing” 
Magnificent was simply a term for 
modifications that would allow 
her to operate more comfortably 
in the cold weather environment 
of the North West Atlantic. The 
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Navy, however, was willing to use 
this angle if it helped shore up the 
defence minister’s support for the 
acquisition of the carrier. But King’s 
attitude towards the Arctic was an 
obstacle. The chief of the naval staff 
(CNS), Vice-Admiral H.E. Reid, was 
already in trouble with King for 
openly criticising the deep budget 
cuts that were making it extremely 
difficult for the Navy to maintain its 
current responsibilities in the Atlantic 
and Pacific.14 More to the point, 
Reid’s objection to the government’s 
funding and manpower ceilings 
underscored a recurring theme that 
would haunt the RCN’s 
efforts in the Arctic between 
1946 and 1950; namely, that 
they would have to respond 
to the growing significance 
of the region with limited 
resources. 
The fact that the RCN 
was struggling to meet 
its current commitment 
to two oceans led some to 
believe that the Navy was 
not interested in Arctic 
defence. Certainly that was 
the impression formed by 
the Army when the vice 
chief of the general staff, 
Major-General Churchill 
Mann, wrote to the Navy on 
30 September 1946 advising 
that his boss, the chief of 
the general staff, was surprised that 
the neither the RCN nor RCAF were 
putting proposals for Arctic exercises 
before the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
It was for that reason that Mann was 
pushing an Army proposal involving 
naval assets with the aim that it could 
be useful to start “a ‘Navy baby.’”15 
The concept itself was ambitious, 
calling for either a 4,700 or 10,000 
ton naval headquarters ship to be 
“frozen in” so it could support a 
purely Canadian Arctic Expedition 
from 1 September 1947 to the end of 
August 1948. Of course, the Navy 
did not have any ships that met 
this requirement and viewed the 
idea of borrowing and adapting an 
American Tank Landing Ship (LST) 
for this task as impractical. Although 
the concept of a Northern operation 
was highly desirable, the Naval Staff 
had no choice but to recommend that 
the Army be told that the Navy was 
in no position to participate in this 
particular exercise.16 
The rejection of the Army 
proposal did not mean that the 
Navy was bereft of its own ideas. 
In fact, according to the assistant 
chief of the naval staff, Commodore 
H.G. DeWolf, the Plans division 
had been “cooking up” 
various Arctic schemes that 
were not entirely dissimilar 
to the one that the Army 
had contemplated. Some 
within the Navy wanted 
to act independently of 
the Americans, as in the 
Army’s proposal. This was 
certainly the view held 
by the director of naval 
plans and intelligence, 
Captain H.N. Lay, who 
had recorded that it was 
inadvisable to approach 
t h e  A m e r i c a n s  a b o u t 
converting a Tank Landing 
ship because it “would 
almost certainly mean the 
USN would wish to be the 
dominant partner in the 
A strong sign of the RCN’s early resolve in the North: the new aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent (left), accompanies 
two destroyers, HMCS Nootka (right) and HMCS Haida into Arctic latitudes during Northern Cruise 1948.
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Horatio Nelson Lay and has famous uncle, Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King during the Second World War.  In 
the postwar years Lay played a pivotal role in getting the RCN 
into the North. 
Library and Archives Canada PA 104221
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expedition, and I believe if Canada 
is able to do it herself, she should do 
so.” As the prime minister’s nephew, 
Lay undoubtedly had the inside 
track on King’s fears of aligning 
too closely with the Americans, 
possibly explaining why he saw a 
unilateral approach as the Navy’s 
best option. In the short-term, the 
Naval Staff seemed to agree as plans 
were hashed out to send the destroyer 
HMCS Nootka on an “exploratory 
expedition” to the Arctic sometime 
over the summer of 1947.17 
Commodore DeWolf, however, 
had reservations about this approach. 
Unconfirmed reports that a Russian 
submarine was operating in the Davis 
Strait only served to re-enforce the 
notion that the RCN would have to 
find ways to operate in the North, 
yet DeWolf recognized that Canada 
simply did not have the maritime 
assets to patrol the region alone.18 
From his perspective, the better 
option was to participate with the 
USN’s next northern deployment. 
Even that, however, would be a 
challenge as DeWolf confided to 
Major-General Mann that the Navy 
was “anxious to send a ship along 
[with the Americans], if we can spare 
one, but to do so we will certainly 
stretch our resources.”19 
The chances of the RCN joining 
an American operation in 1947 were 
slim, but not for the reasons that 
DeWolf gave. Commodore Frank 
Houghton was disappointed to learn 
that the Americans were only sending 
a token force of three ships on what 
was essentially a supply mission.20 
Moreover, while the Americans were 
favourable to a Canadian ship sailing 
with this miniature task force, they 
did have some reservations about 
the “suitability and practicability 
of including light-hulled vessels, 
such as destroyers, in a Force of this 
kind.”21 It was a salient point. This 
task force required an icebreaker 
because it was operating at a time of 
year when heavy ice was still present, 
a circumstance that drove home the 
Top: HMCS Magnificent, the RCN’s newest aircraft carrier, with Sea Fury aircraft on its flight deck while coming to anchor in 
Northern waters; Bottom: HMCS Nootka (R96) refueling from HMCS Magnificent on the Northward journey from Halifax.
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reality that the RCN’s current ships 
could only head north when ice 
conditions were most favourable. 
The impracticality of joining 
the US Navy’s mission in 1947 was 
good news for Lay’s plan for a 
purely RCN northern cruise. Indeed, 
because the Americans were not 
planning anything on the same scale 
as Operation Nanook, the Naval Staff 
saw little value in a joint endeavour. 
Capitalizing on the moment, Lay 
immediately pushed his own agenda, 
reminding the Naval Staff that no 
RCN warships had ever entered 
Hudson Strait or Bay and that “in 
the light of the present interest in the 
Canadian Arctic it is considered that 
such a cruise would be of benefit to 
the Canadian defence programme.” 
The Naval Staff agreed, and with a 
nationalistic fervour observed that 
they were “of the firm opinion that 
it would be preferable to undertake 
a northern cruise under Canadian 
auspices.” On 29 April 1947 the Naval 
Board gave its blessing, and with that 
the RCN had set a tight deadline for 
its plan to embark on its first Arctic 
foray. 22 
The RCN clearly understood the 
growing importance of the Arctic 
as well as the urgent need to show 
the flag there, but they also realized 
that this pioneering excursion would 
pose new logistical and operational 
challenges. Planning for Operation 
Iceworm, which was the codename 
for the proposed Cruise, clearly 
bears this out. The concept itself 
was simple: the destroyers HMCS 
Nootka and Micmac would embark 
on a five to six week northern 
familiarization deployment to 
conduct radio communication tests, 
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Top: RCN personnel involved in a 
Northern deployment get a good sense 
of exactly how far away they are from 
their home port of Halifax while visiting 
Padloping Island; Bottom: Sailors from 
HMCS Swansea, possibly on Padloping 
Island, meeting with members of the 
local community.
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bathythermographic exploration, 
h y d r o g r a p h i c  a n d  m a g n e t i c 
observations.23 Defining the mission 
was the easy part; the complications 
soon followed. Indeed, just as the 
Americans had warned, the window 
of opportunity for operating lightly 
constructed destroyers in the North 
was small as ice conditions dictated 
that the cruise would have to arrive 
before mid-August and leave no later 
than mid-September. But by far the 
greatest obstacle facing the planning 
staff was one that would haunt all the 
RCN’s Arctic ambitions, and that was 
the issue of fuel. 
The intended passage, from 
Halifax to Churchill, Manitoba, 
on Hudson’s Bay and back, was a 
distance of some 4,800 miles, required 
the destroyers to refuel. However 
the two points where this could 
occur, St. John’s, Newfoundland, 
and Churchill, either did not have 
the suitable type of fuel or sufficient 
quantities of it. There were two 
possible solutions to this problem. The 
first was to use tank cars to transport 
fuel to St. John’s and Churchill, while 
the second was to give the soon-
to-be mothballed Canadian Naval 
Auxiliary Vessel Dundalk a temporary 
reprieve by turning her into an Arctic 
refuelling vessel. Each method had its 
drawbacks. For instance, the Dundalk 
had neither a gyroscopic compass 
nor radar, both of which were 
essential for the extreme navigational 
challenges in the iceberg-infested, 
magnetically confused North. 
Nevertheless, this latter option - in 
conjunction with a decision to send 
only a single destroyer (Nootka) – still 
seemed the better one. The expense 
of transporting naval fuel via rail to 
Churchill and St. John’s was just too 
high. Worse yet, even after refuelling 
at St. John’s, Nootka would have only 
25 percent fuel left in reserve by the 
time she reached Churchill, leaving 
no margin for exercises or diversions 
en route.24 
Fuel was a thorny issue for other 
reasons as well. Getting a single 
destroyer to Churchill and back was 
going to consume a considerable 
amount  of  the  RCN’s  year ly 
operational allowance. This was 
particularly problematic since the 
government’s cuts had just forced the 
Navy to reduce that appropriation 
by 25 percent.25 Nevertheless, the 
Northern Cruise obviously had 
momentum, and had it not been 
for the intervention by the defence 
minister, Claxton, the RCN would 
have established its presence in the 
country’s own Arctic waters in the 
summer of 1947. Although a letter 
from Houghton to an American 
admiral makes it clear that it was 
Claxton who cancelled the cruise, it 
is uncertain why he did so.26 
Despite this setback, the RCN was 
undeterred. In addition to forwarding 
a submission for the acquisition a 
Canadian naval icebreaker to the 
defence minister, the Naval Board, at 
its 25 February 1948 meeting, declared 
the intention to dispatch HMC Ships 
on northern cruises during ice free 
periods.27 The Naval Staff also took 
advantage of the time provided by 
Iceworm’s cancellation to plan a 
new and far more ambitious cruise 
scheduled for 2–28 September 1948. 
Although the aims would remain 
the same as Iceworm, the forces 
assigned were considerably larger. 
Along with the destroyer Nootka, the 
RCN was now planning to send her 
sister ship Haida, as well as the new 
aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent.28 
Because the minister’s support for the 
acquisition of Magnificent had been 
partly contingent on her ability to 
operate in cold weather environments 
this deployment so early in her career 
was smart politics even if she was 
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A great sea level view of Haida, Nootka and Magnificent on their transit North.
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4
42
not going to participate in the full 
voyage. Instead, Magnificent would 
conduct air operations with the RCAF 
while sailing with the destroyers up 
the Labrador coast to Wakeham Bay. 
After topping up the destroyer’s 
fuel, Magnificent would head back 
to Halifax, while Nootka and Haida 
would make a stop at Erik Cove before 
continuing on to Churchill through 
Hudson Strait and Bay. On the return 
voyage the destroyers, having fuelled 
in Churchill, would sail to Coral 
Harbour on Southampton Island 
followed by Port Burwell where 
Dundalk would be waiting with one 
last consignment of fuel.29 
The fear of running out of fuel 
and stranding a destroyer in northern 
waters was still a dominant anxiety, 
explaining why the Navy was now 
willing to employ both the tank car 
and Dundalk methods of refuelling 
that had been explored for Iceworm. 
There were other risks as well. 
Dundalk in particular was vulnerable. 
There was no time to install radar, 
and that left some officers worried 
about her operating off the often 
foggy and ice-packed Labrador coast 
with inadequate charts.30 The fact 
that Captain A.H. Storrs was about 
to replace Captain H.F. Pullen as 
the commanding officer of Nootka 
was also a point of concern for 
the flag officer Atlantic Coast who 
considered it “unfair…to have him 
make his first voyage…in these 
poorly charted waters.”31 While 
Naval Service Headquarters saw 
this as overly cautious and even 
suspected that Pullen was lobbying 
to extend his command for the 
trip, they were in the process of 
exploring other precautions, such as 
additional shackles for potentially 
deep anchorages, propeller guards, 
as well as assigning specialized 
personnel to the cruise. They also 
examined the possibility of acquiring 
25-foot motorboat cutters equipped 
with echo sounders that would scout 
out areas for the destroyers where 
depth information was scanty.32 
Although careful planning and 
preparations resulted in a cruise 
that was a tremendous success there 
were disappointments. The Navy had 
already admitted that Magnificent’s 
part in the exercise was “a small one,” 
but inclement weather ensured that 
her role was diminished further.33 
This particular aspect of the voyage 
was a setback, especially since Navy 
and Air Force planners had gone 
to such lengths to produce creative 
war scenarios. Situations where 
Magnificent’s aircraft would have 
covered a fictional wartime Hudson 
Bay-bound convoy, or conducted 
reconnaissance missions looking 
for enemy refuelling depots, would 
A good example of the distances that RCN ships had to travel to reach Canada’s arctic waters exposing why fuel was always a 
concern on round trips from Halifax.  
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have provided invaluable training.34 
Instead, Magnificent’s single day of 
flying was spent with her fighters 
countering enemy reconnaissance 
flights staged by a RCAF Avro 
Lancaster and Consolidated Canso. 
Much was learned from these 
shadowing exercises, but the true 
significance of Magnificent’s presence 
was that the RCN had shown its 
resolve to send its most valuable 
asset into the Arctic.35 It was a brief, 
but shinning, moment as Magnificent 
would never again sail this far north 
in North American waters. 
This cruise was undoubtedly the 
high point of the RCN’s involvement 
in the Arctic in the late 1940s, the more 
so since the rest of the deployment 
went so well. Much intelligence was 
gleaned, equipment successfully 
tested and invaluable scientific data 
gathered, but the cruise was also 
a success for a number of other 
reasons. Both Nootka and Haida 
reported that they experienced no 
major difficulties with navigation 
and found summer operations in 
the region similar to the western 
north Atlantic in iceberg season. 
Future cruises were nonetheless 
recommended because of the limited 
area covered as well as the fact that 
the terrain and atmosphere were so 
different, a point that was illustrated 
by the unusually deep anchorage of 
40 fathoms in Wakeham Bay. The 
deployment was also popular with 
the crew and offered the Navy a 
good public relations opportunity 
in Churchill as well as the smaller 
communities that were visited. As 
was anticipated, ice and fuel were 
the only serious concerns during the 
cruise; small growlers and “bergy 
bits” were not always detected while 
the destroyers’ consumption rate 
left “little margin for unforeseen 
contingencies.”36
The force sent to the Arctic 
in 1948 was a relatively large 
one by Canadian standards, but 
unfortunately the RCN could not 
afford to repeat this powerful 
expression of sovereignty during 
the following year. Instead, they 
settled for three smaller deployments. 
The voyage of the frigate HMCS 
Swansea ,  which travelled from 
Halifax to Frobisher Bay and 
Godthaab, Greenland, between 24 
August and 20 September 1949, was 
particularly important because it 
represented an attempt to continue 
an independent RCN presence in the 
north. Tasked with the same scientific 
explorations, familiarisation and 
training work started by the previous 
year’s cruise, Swansea’s experience 
was unsurprisingly similar those 
of Nootka and Haida. Nevertheless, 
an incident at the American base 
on Padloping Island underscored 
the need for a Canadian naval 
presence in the Arctic. “The NCO-
in-charge stated that some of his men 
were wondering why a Canadian 
Warship was in these waters,” wrote 
Swansea’s CO: “It was pointed out in 
a friendly but firm manner that this 
was not unreasonable since this was 
Canada.”37 
The participation of HMCS 
Cedarwood and HMCS Haida in two 
separate joint ventures with the 
Americans did little to raise the RCN’s 
profile in the region. 38 In fact, Haida’s 
involvement in Exercise Noramex 
demonstrated how the RCN’s limited 
resources left Canada with little 
choice but to rely on the USN to 
help defend its North. Designed 
to prevent an enemy force from 
turning a Labrador weather station 
into an airstrip, the 33 American 
ships and 3,500 marines dwarfed the 
lone Canadian destroyer assigned to 
the exercise. The RCN had wanted 
to provide additional forces, but 
operational commitments elsewhere 
prevented them from doing so. 
The dream of sending Canadian 
destroyers and frigates on yearly 
cruises to the North had already come 
to an end, but things only got worse in 
1950. 39 Further manning reductions 
and anti-submarine requirements in 
the Atlantic and Pacific were making 
it hard for the RCN to join Noramex 
II, but just as they had done over the 
past four years the Naval Board was 
willing to go to extreme lengths to 
scavenge personnel to man Nootka 
for this particular exercise. It was all 
for naught as once again operational 
factors (this time the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea) placed these 
Arctic ambitions on the backburner.40 
The RCN would not return to 
the Arctic until HMCS Labrador, the 
Navy’s new icebreaker, sailed into 
these waters in the summer of 1954, 
and this long gap would suggest that 
the RCN’s capabilities did not match 
the large operational significance 
the service attached to the region. 
In reality, the 1948 Northern Cruise 
represented the type of presence 
that the RCN wanted regularly to 
maintain in the Arctic during the 
summer months. Unfortunately, 
those ambitions could not be realized 
in the face of budget cuts, manning 
shortages, existing operational 
commitments, and ship limitations, 
as well as restrictions imposed by 
logistical and fuelling constraints. 
But one thing was clear: the Navy’s 
desire to work in the North between 
1946 and 1950 was there even if the 
resources were not.
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